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REVIEWS
They are not. They have been the grounds on which most cases have been
decided. Despite all the debate about the fitness to teach of the avowed Com-
munist, that issue, ironically, is indeed an academic one. So far as I know, there
has not been such a case since the day back in 1948 when Professors Phillips
and Butterworth acknowledged their Party membership to their colleagues at
the University of Washington.
It is more than ironic, it is tragic for the cause of academic freedom, that a
brave new ideal has suffered so much for the assumed faults of so few. Except
in isolated instances like the New York city colleges in the 1930's, Communists
never were significant in American academic life. Now, I am confident, they
have practically disappeared. But the damage has been done; and it will take
many Maclvers and much goodwill before the bloom is restored.
RALPH S. BROWN, JR.'"
NINE MEN: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT FROM 1790 TO
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PROFESSOR Rodell's book describes and appraises the powerful part the Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court play in our government. In the foreword he warns
his readers that his appraisals will be influenced by prejudices based on his
"ideas and ideals"--which he identifies as those of "that great and unlike group
that is fuzzily labeled 'liberal' . . or lookers-after-the-other-fellow."' He hopes
that his evaluations of the Justices he has known are based on his ideals rather
than "petty, personal things," and it is in this light that Holmes is one of his
"major heroes," McReynolds one of his "near villains," and Douglas "rated
in this book considerably above Justice Frankfurter.' 2 He will try to
"give the devils their more than due" and at the same time stick to his most
important ideal or prejudice-an "almost fanatical devotion to personal integrity
that combines intellectual honesty, with courage."'3 He will exclude all matters
of interest only to lawyers and will try to write "so that any halfway literate
non-lawyer can understand."'4
The power of the Court is the power of the majority of the Justices, and
their power, Rodell maintains, is "unique," "autocratic" and "irresponsible."
Their decisions can override Congress, the President, state legislatures, and all
lesser national, state and local officials. Checks on their power provided in the
Constitution are too limited and slow-moving to have much effect. Only once in
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this century has the Senate rejected a presidential nomination for the Court;
no Justice has ever been removed by impeachment; and the cumbersome pro-
cedure for amending the Constitution has seldom been used to change the effect
of a Court decision. The Court is the only department of our government that
conducts its major deliberations in utter secrecy, and that never reports on its
secret deliberations. The Justices can, moreover, exercise their power evasive-
ly, and thereby the more autocratically. After hearing a case they can refuse
to decide an issue by calling it "political" and therefore beyond their power. Yet
in other cases they do decide political questions-for instance, whether the tide-
lands oil is owned by the states or the nation. And they may refuse to hear a case
without giving any reason for their refusal, even though the refusal may have the
same consequences as an actual decision in the case. Rodell disputes the dictum
that "all that a denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari means is that fewer
than four members thought it should be granted" ;" it means, he says, much
more. It is in effect a full and, in the great majority of instances, a silent
affirmation of the lower courts' decisions: a man convicted of perjury would
have to serve his prison sentence and a man convicted of first-degree murder
might be hanged, despite their appeals for hearings before the Supreme Court
-which gave no reasons for its refusal to review their cases.
So Rodell regards the Supreme Court Justices as "the most powerful and
the most irresponsible . . .men in the world"--who exercise their immense
power, moreover, not as judicial men who know or find the law, but as "highly
human and hence inevitably political men." s A lawyer who has spent his pro-
fessional life serving business clients cannot as a Justice forget his prejudices
in favor of such clients; and a lawyer who has devoted his public activities to
advancing liberal measures cannot suddenly become impartial in passing on the
constitutionality of such measures. 9
Considering the question of the origin of this "indubitable" power of the
Justices, Rodell says that the answer is not so "black-or-white simple, nor yet
so difficult, nor even so important, as the scholarly squabbles of historians and
political scientists would sometimes make it seem.""' To explode "misconcep-
tions about what the Court should be today, based on misconceptions about
what it was at its birth," and to dispel "illusions about the Court being any other
than an essentially political body, . . . so intended, from its very creation,"
Rodell enters the squabble long enough to establish his own black-and-white,
and presumably important, conclusion: the "Court's political power was con-
ceived, if furtively, during the drafting of the Constitution; . . . carefully
nourished prenatally by the Federalist Party during the early years of the
nation's life while that party controlled the entire federal government: ... skill-








had lost the Congress and the Presidency."" Rodell sketches the lives of the
Justices who served before Marshall (who was appointed in 1801) in order to
show that most of them were "mediocre" lawyers or judges, selected by Wash-
ington and Adams for their political views rather than for their particular talents
as expert, impartial interpreters of the Constitution and the statutes of Congress.
They were there, as the historian J. Allen Smith observed, to help make the
national government "an adequate bulwark of conservatism. 1' 2 The bulk of
Rodell's book consists of descriptions of the gradual growth of the Court's poli-
tical power, from the time of Marshall, "the Great Chief Justice," to that of
Warren-who, Rodell believes, may come close "to resembling a might-be
twentieth-century Marshall." 13
Rodell calls Marbury v. Madison "the most important decision in all Su-
preme Court history.' 4 He describes Marshall's adroitness in bringing into a
single controversy over a minute issue (whether the Court should order Presi-
dent Jefferson's Secretary of State to deliver to one of ex-President Adams'
minor "midnight" appointees his commission of appointment) a series of hold-
ings serving Marshall's over-all political intentions. Marshall held that Madi-
son was legally obligated to deliver the commission, that a petition for man-
damus was the proper remedy, and that the Secretary of State was not too high
an official to be mandamused-but that Congress had acted invalidly in con-
ferring on the Supreme Court original jurisdiction beyond that specified in the
Constitution. Then, having rebuked President Jefferson's Secretary of State
and yet successfully avoided a hopeless fight with Jefferson (an arch political
enemy who probably would have refused to turn over the commission, man-
damus or no), Marshall proceeded, through an analysis of the meanings and
logical implications of the words of the Constitution. to prove that the framers
clearly meant to give to the federal courts the right and obligation to invalidate
congressional acts that the courts deemed inconsistent with the words of the
Constitution. In later cases Marshall made political use of this power: by inter-
preting such words as "regulate," "commerce," "among the several states,"
"obligation of contracts" and "necessary and proper," he sustained congres-
sional statutes benefiting the propertied groups favored by his party, and nulli-
fied state statutes favorable to the interests of smaller-propertied groups.
In the middle section of his book,'1 Rodell considers, period by period, the
varying constitutional interpretations set forth by the Court during the century
from Taney's Court to the early years of Hughes' Chief-Justiceship. He ex-
plains these variations in terms of the biases of changing Court majorities. For
Taney's Court, Rodell notes the shift in the Court's interest from the "banker-
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South and West.16 Although Taney's slaveholding-plantation bias made him
uphold the fugitive slave law and deny Dred Scott his freedom, some of his
decisions protected the interests of small farmers; and Taney "struck a brave
blow for individual liberties" when he ruled, during the Civil War, that only
Congress, not the President, could suspend the writ of habeas corpus.'1
In analyzing the Court's record from the end of the Civil War through the
1920's, Rodell gives chief attention to the conflicts between pro-business, or
illiberal, Justices and pro-labor and -farmer, or liberal, Justices, with the former
winning most of the battles. Most notable of the dominant element's achieve-
ments was the Court's engrafting onto the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
due process clauses of a prohibition of legislation (by either Congress or the
states) deemed by the Court to be unreasonable regulation of private business.
Rodell gives due praise to the famous dissents by Holmes and Brandeis in such
cases. He deplores, however, what he regards as a fateful liberal-supported
blunder in this period-the Court's adoption (in cases under the Espionage and
Sedition acts of World War I) of the Holmes-Brandeis "clear-and-present-
danger" test for the validity of legislation limiting freedom of speech. He calls
this formula Holmes' "greatest, and only major, judicial error," leading less
liberal and less intelligent Justices into "diluting the strong, straight stuff of
the First Amendment, with its absolute ban on congressional meddling with
freedom of speech."' 8
Rodell's complaints become fierier as he reviews the Court's record during
the two decades before Warren's appointment as Chief Justice in 1953. He
considers the Hughes Court's attempts, in 1935 and 1936, to defeat the New
Deal, and the same Court's surrender in early 1937; the vacillation and discord
in the "New Deal Court" between 1939 and 1949; and the "shameful" record
of the "Vinson [or Truman] Court" in its "judicial disregard of most personal
freedoms."' 9
Rodell calls the Court's fight against the New Deal "the most famous and ex-
citing short-span period" in the history of the Court.20 In two years the "judi-
cial guardians of property" (Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland and But-
ler) joined by two more intelligent and independent conservatives (Hughes
and Roberts) invalidated over a dozen congressional and state statutes
controlling private economic activities, yet the same Court seemed indifferent
to various governmental encroachments on civil liberties. There are differences
of opinion as to what caused the Court's sudden change in January 1937. Some
believe that the unprecedented popular majority in the 1936 election persuaded
Hughes and Roberts to make their famous switch-the Justices following the
election returns, as Justices have done before and since. Rodell prefers a more








Court that forced the switch. He says that "for all the forensics and falderol,
political pressure would have pushed the plan through had not Hughes proved
the most astute statesman of them all."'21 He does admit, however, as a possible
explanation the one to which many observers subscribe-that the pressure of
public opinion, as revealed in both the election returns and the widespread
congressional and newspaper criticism, was sufficient to cause the Court's
switch. Some observers believe the same force accounted for defeat of the
President's bill in Congress. "The Court Reorganization Bill of 1937," John
Lord O'Brian said recently, "was defeated because of the moral resentment ex-
pressed by the great mass of people whose sense of fair play was outraged by
the proposal. '22
With Roosevelt's fifth appointment (Murphy succeeding Butler in 1939)
the Court became a "pro-New Deal" Court and remained that until the deaths
of Murphy and Rutledge in 1949. The Roosevelt Justices, when they were a
minority, had maintained a tight unity of dissenting "black-and-white" con-
victions. As a majority they were unable to control or conceal their "intellectual
disharmony." 23 The result was a mixture of right and wrong decisions, with
strange cross-switches between liberal and illiberal Justices. On religious free-
dom this Court's record was prevailingly good: in more than a score of decisions
it protected the right of a small religious sect (Jehovah's Witnesses) to spread
their propaganda on the streets without having to buy the licenses that various
states or cities tried to require of them; and it restored to conscientious ob-
jectors among resident aliens their right to become naturalized citizens. Rodell
finds no significant gain for freedom of speech in this Court's record: he notes
that the Court properly protected that freedom in upholding the right of news-
papers to criticize a judge's behavior in conducting a trial, but that it wavered
between right and wrong decisions on the rights of working men in peaceful
picketing. He believes the Court was at its worst in its decisions supporting
the wholesale evacuation and confinement of West-coast Japanese-American
citizens of "proved loyalty. 2 4 And he finds the Court at its best, making per-
haps "its most enduring contributions to public law,"25 in its many decisions
establishing various rights for Negroes: voting rights in elections and primaries;
equal seating rights on interstate busses; and full benefit of the constitutional
guaranties of fair trials in the criminal courts (assistance of counsel, fairly
selected juries, and protection from "third-degree" methods of extorting con-
fessions).
What Rodell calls the "Vinson Court" began in 1949, when Truman added
Clark and Minton (succeeding Murphy and Rutledge) to his two earlier
appointees (Burton and Vinson), and ended with Vinson's death in 1953. Since
three of the surviving Roosevelt appointees-Reed, Frankfurter and Jackson-
21. P. 248.
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frequently sided with the Truman Justices on important cases, there remained
on this Court only two reliable liberals-Black and Douglas. Rodell considers
the Vinson Court's record extremely bad. He credits this Court with one out-
standingly liberal performance-its decision ordering Southern state univer=
sities to admit qualified Negroes to their professional and graduate schools
where equal opportunities for such training were not provided in the states'
segregated schools for Negroes. For the rest, he generally has praise only for
the dissenters, finding the majority decisions almost wholly wrong: upholding
the imprisonment of an inflammatory speaker where the threat of violence
came from the audience rather than from the speaker; upholding convictions
obtained through the use of coerced confessions; and a "spend-thrift use" of the
power to refuse to hear appeals in important cases involving questions of trial
fairness.26 His bitterest criticism is directed against the decision upholding the
Smith Act conviction of the eleven Communist officials, a decision which, he
says, was "the biggest blot on the Vinson Court's blot-marked ledger, ' 27 for it
all but abolished the free speech guarantee of the First Amendment. His final
appraisal of Vinson and his Court is as follows: "For all his undoubted patriot-
ism, chauvinist style, Vinson, less than any other man who ever headed the
Court... understood the real meaning of American democracy" ;2s his Court-
except in the Negro cases--"while purporting to fight a foreign tyranny, actu-
ally aped it."
'29
Rodell finds some "harbingers of hope" in the record and personnel of the
"Warren Court." Warren himself had made a good liberal record as Governor of
California-raising old age pensions, urging the enactment of compulsory medi-
cal insurance and appointing the first Negro to a judgeship in a state superior
trial court. Rodell also finds some balance of good in the newest Associate
Justice. Past success as a "Wall Street lawyer," and some of his other business
associations, may make Harlan "pro-business" and "pro-State" on questions
of governmental regulation of business. Yet in his brief service as a judge on
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit he showed concern for fair treat-
ment of defendants; and as special counsel for New York City's Board of Edu-
cation he supported the effort to bring "unconforming" Bertrand Russell to the
City College faculty. Thus Harlan may help "turn the tables the other way"
on civil liberties.30
However, the record of the first term of the Warren Court is in Rodell's eyes
only halfway good. The Court's flat outlawing of segregation in the public
schools was its "one major, and clearly historic, move," and its unanimity in
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skill and force." 31 And Rodell is pleased to note that Warren sided with Black
and Douglas in half the close civil liberties cases. But he blames Warren and
his Court for the decision upholding the congressional act that gave the tide-
lands oil back to the states. On the basis of the record so far Rodell makes this
hopeful estimate of Warren's possible place in the history of the Supreme
Court:
"[WJhere Marshall's achievement was to protect a weak nation, as a
nation, from its people, Warren's opportunity is the precise opposite; it is
to protect the people, as people, from their strong nation. Given the will
and the good-will to do it, he can succeed."'3 2
The idea that the Justices are active and important participants in the formu-
lation of public policy and that in this function they are not, and should not
regard themselves as being, mere legal technicians or impartial logicians, has
long been familiar in the writing of historians and political scientists ;33 and has
been recognized, somewhat later, by professors of law. Presidents and senators
have urged that the policy-forming function of the Justices should be a deter-
mining consideration in the appointment of a Justice.34 Professor Felix Frank-
furter, writing in 1916, sought to demolish the popular myth that "the nine
Justices embody pure reason... set apart from the concerns of the communi-
ty."35 "The Justices as individuals," Frankfurter said later, "with all their
diversities of endowment, experience, and outlook, determine the Court's
actions"; and history would have recorded "fewer explosive periods if, from the
beginning, there had been a more continuous awareness of the role of the Court
in the dynamic process of American society" and in "the interplay of ... poli-
tical and economic forces." 30
In explaining the performances of the various Justices in their role as policy-
makers Rodell's theme is that the record of the Justices "is quite incomprehen-
sible except in the light of what they were like and how they got that way."'3 7
Thus we can better understand an antilabor or illiberal decision if we know that
it was made by a Justice who was the son of rich parents, or who was "conven-
tionally" educated (e.g., according to Rodell, at Yale College), or who had
been a successful railroad attorney, or "top boss of a Republican State machine."
And it helps us to understand a liberal decision if we know that it was made by
a justice who was the son of a "dirt-poor farmer," or who was self-educated or
less conventionally educated, or who had earned moderate wealth as a lawyer
for labor unions. "Idiosyncrasies" of the Justices also count: one sort of opinion
31. P. 326.
32. P. 331.
33. Cf. "Justices Without Halos," in PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT 14-22 (1948).
34. See preceding article, Paul, Justice Black and Federal Taxation, 65 YALE L.J.
495, 506-08 (1956).
35. FRANKFURTER, LAW AND POLITICS: OCCASIONAL PAPERS 108 (1939).
36. Id. at 61.
37. P. 264,
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comes from a Justice who is "least intellectually gifted," or whose "intellectual
home" is at Harvard, or who is characteristically "opportunist," and another
sort from a justice who is "forth-right," or "humanitarian," or a "passionate
crusader for liberties." Rodell does not maintain this as an absolute rule; there
are exceptions such as Holmes, a "Back-Bay Republican" rendering liberal
decisions. Some of these observations seem relevant and useful; some seem
repetitious or superfluous; and some clearly irrelevant-as when, in describing
Justices whose judicial behavior Rodell prevailingly dislikes, he refers to the
"perpetual bow-tie" worn by one, calls another "little," and another "frog-
mouthed."
Rodell's vividly narrated political history of the Court from its beginning
through the 1940's seems to be generally authentic history, and his appraisals
are interesting and "provocative." As a historian appraising the past, he had
an easier task than as a commentator weighing events and opinions of yester-
day and today. To a considerable extent the historian's material has been
selected, sorted and (somewhat varyingly) explained. The commentator on con-
temporary events may have neither time nor perspective for thorough study
and accurate judgment. This makes reliable appraisals more difficult, even
though it also makes it easier to proclaim assured judgments. This difficulty
besets both an author and a reviewer commenting on the author's work, in
dealing with such matters as the meaning of constitutional provisions and the
rightness or wrongness of the several Justices' interpretations of them. An
added difficulty, in dealing with the First Amendment, is presented by the vary-
ing, wavering interpretations that have been set forth by the various Justices,
including Rodell's heroes as well as his villains. Rodell's treatment of the
Dennis case,38 upholding the first conviction of Communists under the Smith
Act, illustrates the problem.
In discussing the Dennis case Rodell asserts that the Vinson Court-affirm-
ing convictions not for any act, but for "talking and writing... teaching and
advocating Communism" "gave its... benediction.., to a law that flatly violated
the free-speech guarantee of the First Amendment." 0 Vinson was either
"ignorant" or "intellectually dishonest," for he purported to, but did not, stick
to Holmes' exception; there wasn't any danger, Rodell says, either clear or
present.40 Douglas, on the other hand, "hewed straight, in the Holmes-Brandeis
tradition," calling free speech "the glory of our system of government ... not
[to] be sacrificed [without] . . . plain and objective proof of danger that ... is
imminent." 4' Rodell says nothing about the specific evidence presented in the
case, as cited by either Douglas or Vinson, and nothing about the conditions
of the time, as appraised by either of the Justices, that might make the specific
teaching safe or dangerous.






Both Vinson and Douglas in their opinions in Dennis declared their devotion
to the constitutional guarantee of free speech; and both specified exceptions to
that guarantee. Douglas, noting that "the Constitution provides no exception," 42
provided his own. He said: "If this were a case where those who claimed pro-
tection under the First Amendment were teaching the techniques of sabotage,
the assassination of the President, the filching of documents from the public files,
the planting of bombs, the art of street warfare, and the like, I should have no
doubts. The freedom to speak is not absolute. '43 Both Justices agreed that the
test for an exception depends not only on the words used, but also on the con-
ditions commonly known to have existed at the time of the utterances. "Speech
innocuous one year," Douglas said, "may at another time fan such destructive
flames that it must be halted in the interests of the safety of the Republic. '44
Where Vinson and Douglas differed was in their selection and appraisal of
items both from the documents placed in evidence and from the existing foreign
and domestic conditions of which they took judicial notice. Douglas found that
the petitioners taught a creed of revolution "with the hope that some day it
would be acted on" ;45 but he also found that the conditions were highly un-
favorable for the acceptance of such teachings. 46 He noted our strong democratic
tradition, our high literacy rate, and our secure economic situation-no long
bread lines, no unemployed walking the streets, the country "not in despair. '47
He noted that "the people understand Soviet Communism" and that "the wares"
of these "miserable merchants of unwanted ideas.., remain unsold." 48 He con-
cluded that there was little likelihood that the Communists through their teach-
ings could have gained enough adherents to form either an effective political
party or a revolutionary group strong enough to make a dangerous attempt at
overthrowing the government.49 From the same documents and conditions
Vinson found that the teachers used assumed names and held secret meetings,
and that the party leaders kept their teachings consistently in accord with
changes in policy by the Russian Communist Party and government. He took
note of the inflammable world conditions in which we were heavily involved,
and the repeated manifestations of Russian hostility to our country. He con-
cluded that there was a clear likelihood that what the petitioners taught and
advocated would bring on injurious attempts which, under the Holmes-Brandeis
doctrine, we had the right to forestall."
Douglas and Vinson might have cited more items than they did from the
documentary evidence-showing that the petitioners taught such things as these:
42. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 590 (1951).
43. Id. at 531.
44. Id. at 585.
45. Id. at 582.
46. Id. at 588.
47. Ibid.
48. Id. at 589.
49. Id. at 590.
50. Id. at 510-11.
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the function of party leaders is to teach "the theory and tactics of the inter-
national proletariat"; the tactics should include "parliamentary methods," but
only scorn should be poured on those "pacific socialists" who put their main
faith in such methods and who are afraid to use "illegal methods"; the leaders
should engage in and urge others to engage in "illegal work"; "revolutionary
slogans and resolutions" are worthless unless they are "backed by deeds"; the
party should "establish alliances" with Communist parties in other countries-
especially the Russian party; "the fires of revolution" should be "kindled in
every country"; Communist parties everywhere should look to Russia as "the
centre of attraction," the "mighty centre for workers in all countries," the
"leader" and "the mother country of world revolution."'
Would Douglas say that there was no "common" or "judicial" knowledge
that some of the Communists' "wares" were "sold," that documents had been
filched and information illegally obtained for the benefit of Russia, and that-
as judge Learned Hand, no indifferent liberal, said in his opinion upholding
the convictions 52 -Russia had overthrown several European governments, in
support of local parties unable to maintain their Communist governments by
their own unallied strength? How soon after speech teaching the filching of
documents would an actual theft have to occur for Douglas to sustain a convic-
tion for the teaching-about which he said he would "have no doubts"? How
immediately did Holmes and Brandeis think that an obstruction of recruiting
and enlistment would result from the Schenck pamphlet's wartime denunciation
of the draft?
What is said above is not intended as an assured appraisal of either the Smith
Act or the Dennis decision.5 3 Rather it is an attempt to probe the extent of
Douglas' "straight-line" conformity to the Holmes-Brandeis formula, for which
he wins Rodell's praise; and it has relevance to a more general comment on
Rodell's (and now Black's ?) 54 renunciation of that formula.
Rodell says that it "is precisely in protecting the expression of all views, how-
ever extreme or unpopular and no matter how much it may hurt to protect
them, that freedom of speech has a more than mushy meaning. '"' He says, or
implies, that just that was what the framers and ratifiers of the First Amend-
51. See STALIN, FouNDATIONS OF LENINIS.M, passim (rev. transl. 1932). Similar
teachings can be found in other books listed by Douglas as evidence presented at
the trial showing what was taught by the petitioners.
52. Dennis v. United States, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950).
53. Rodell-despite his fervent denunciations of the Dennis decision upholding the con-
victions of the Communist officials-says nothing at all about the first prosecution and con-
victions under the Smith Act. Officials of the Socialists Workers Party ("Trotskyites")
had been convicted, in December 1941, for advocacy surely no more threatening than that
later shown against the Communists. The Supreme Court three times refused hearings in
the earlier case, without any -protest by Black, Douglas, or any of the others. Dunne v.
United States, 138 F.2d 137 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 790, rehearings denied, 320
U.S. 814, 815 (1943).




ment meant. He says: "The eighteenth-century revolutionaries who wrote the
Constitution flatly banned, without one iota of qualification, any congressional
law 'abridging freedom of speech.' ,6 There are more deviators-early and
late, liberal and other-from Rodell's strong dogma than he seems to recognize.
Eighteenth century revolutionaries put into their state constitutions "unquali-
fied" statements that "freedom of the press" (their phrase for freedom of
speech) "shall remain inviolable," "shall be inviolably preserved,"5 7 and the
like. Yet they, and their governmental successors, continued to maintain the
traditional, generally assumed and accepted, limitations on speech-limitations
that have been enforced in the courts without much serious suggestion from any
quarter that the limitations violate the First Amendment.
In 1937 Brandeis suggested that the First Amendment's guarantee covered
means of communication other than speech: it protected working men using
their own means of publicity to "make known the facts of a labor dispute" in
"a lawful form of appeal to the public."5 s Murphy spoke for a unanimous Court
when, a few years later, he held valid a state statute forbidding a local pro-
scription of peaceful picketing; and this principle has been followed in later
decisions.r, Yet Black, speaking for a unanimous Court in 1949, upheld an
injunction against peaceful picketers who were trying to force an ice company to
stop selling ice to non-union peddlers. 60 In this case Black, still treating peace-
ful picketing as protected by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech,
explained his qualification of that freedom as follows:
"[I]t has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or
press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was
in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language either
spoken, written, or printed .... Such an expansive interpretation of the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press would make it
practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint
of trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies deemed in-
jurious to society." 6'
Black later joined in opinions by Frankfurter and Minton upholding injunc-
tions against peaceful picketing used for an improper purpose. 62
The First Amendment is as unqualified in guaranteeing freedom of religion
as in guaranteeing freedom of speech. Yet in 1942, Murphy--"humanitarian
... passionate crusader for liberties for everyone everywhere" 63 -spoke for a
56. Pp. 208-09.
57. See the following early state Constitutions: S.C. CONST. § 43 (1778) ; N.H. CONST.
§ 22 (1784) ; GA. Co-sT. § 22 (1789), reproduced in F.N. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CoNsTITIOs (1910).
58. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 478, 481 (1937).
59. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
60. Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
61. Id. at 502.
62. Building Service Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950); Hughes v. Superior
Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
63. P. 278.
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unanimous Court in upholding the conviction of a religious speaker for words
he had used to denounce a policeman who had ordered him to stop arguing with
passersby on the streets of Rochester, New Hampshire, on a busy Saturday
afternoon.6 4 The speaker had called the policeman a "damned Fascist" and
"damned racketeer." Murphy held that such "fighting words" (in this instance
inciting a breach of peace by the arresting official) were not covered by the
First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech and of religion05 Holmes,
in 1915, upheld the conviction of a man for violating a state statute that forbade
speech that tended to encourage or advocate disrespect for law. 0 The defendant
had claimed that the statute as applied denied him his freedom of speech as
guaranteed by the First Amendment. Holmes held that to forbid speech tend-
ing to encourage violation of a valid statute was not prohibited by the Con-
stitution.
Holmes, Brandeis and other Justices have maintained that speech may have
the quality of an attempt and an attempt may have the quality of an act-an
act of the sort we have the right to prevent; and that probable success of such
an attempt through speech is not a necessary criterion in applying the clear
and present danger test. Holmes said in the Schenck case: "If the act, (speak-
ing, or circulating a paper,) its tendency and intent with which it is done are
the same, we perceive no ground for saying that success alone warrants making
the act of speaking a crime."6 7
Thus, the First Amendment has not been regarded, by either founding
fathers or liberal Justices, as a guarantee of unlimited free speech. Rodell,
too, inserts a qualification of his own when he says that the First Amendment
guarantees freedom of political speech.68 That qualification is certainly a capital
Iota, and not one intended by the eighteenth century revolutionaries. In an
"Address to the People of Quebec," the Continental Congress of 1774 explained
that by "freedom of the press" they meant freedom of speech in advancing
"truth, science, morality and arts in general," as well as speech in its "diffusion
of liberal sentiment on the administration of Government." 9 There is, more-
over, nothing to indicate that the eighteenth century constitution-makers in-
tended to make "political" speech completely free.
Perhaps for the sake of the comfort of an absolute creed, or perhaps to alert
the reader to the risk we run in narrowing the scope of free speech, Rodell
uses strong language that may not further his cause-language that does not
help the reader understand the essential problem of finding some sort of fairly
workable line for distinguishing between proper and improper limitations
on speech. It is this problem, set in the context of the particular times,
that has given rise to the Supreme Court's varying interpretations of
64. Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
65. Id. at 572.
66. Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915).
67. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,52 (1919).
68. P. 22 and passim.
69. 1 JOURNALS OF CONG. 58, 61 (1777).
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the freedom of speech. The issues here, between author and reviewer,
have nothing much to do with conflicting views on the glory of free
speech in our society. Rather the issues are: whether Rodell's interpretation
of the First Amendment is any more genuinely humane, any more consistently
applicable than the Holmes-Brandeis interpretation; whether in the Dennis
case Douglas did hew straighter than Vinson to the Holmes-Brandeis line; and
more generally, whether eloquent eulogies of free speech and "forth-right" de-
nunciations of "senseless fears" are of much help, in applying so generalized a
formula as either the clear and present danger test or Rodell's qualified "no-
qualification" interpretation.
"Clear and present [or immediate, imminent] danger" is not a precise ex-
pression. To define a danger as "present," the posited interval between speech
and its sensibly feared consequences may be a matter of seconds-as when a
man shouts fire in a theater. But certainly Holmes and the other Justices could
not have had any such immediacy in mind when they sent Schenck, Debs, and
others to jail for what they had said; and Douglas could not have had such
promptness in mind when he listed the sorts of speech he would have no doubts
about restraining. It seems sensible to believe that the gravity of a danger, rather
than the degree of its imminence, should count most.
The clear and present danger test has its difficulties of application; so would
Rodell's formula, if he means what he seems to mean-complete freedom of
speech, political or other, no matter how libelous, fraudulent, peace-breaching,
crime-inciting, seditious, or security-endangering it may be. If Rodell did not
mean to include all such speech in his strong-straight formula, without any iota
of qualification, I think he should have specified and explained his rejected
qualifications. An "of course" disclaimer here would not be sufficient, after his
many sweeping words of praise or denunciation in his comments on the behavior
of the several Justices. "There is every reason," said Holmes (discussing our
"imperfect social generalizations" in "our system of morality") "for trying to
make our desires intelligent." 70 And there is every reason why a Justice of
the Supreme Court should make his judicial opinions clear and precise. "The
precise problem of the Dennis case," a professor of political science has said
recently, "is not solved by an appeal to the abstraction 'free speech' any more
than the Adkins problem was solved by invoking 'liberty of contract.' A
Brandeis Brief is as relevant in one case as in the other."
71
Since Rodell's book went to press there have been some gains for free speech,
fair trials and equal protection of the laws: some of these gains were in de-
cisions by the Supreme Court; others, possibly under the influence of the Court's
current attitudes, were in actions by other courts and governmental agencies.
The Supreme Court has, in the last year, reversed some convictions for con-
70. Holmes, Ideals and Doubts, 10 ILL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1915).
71. Mendelson, Reply to Professor Beth, 17 J. PoLuics 286, 290 (1955).
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tempt of Congress in refusals to answer questions by committee-investigators,
where the committee had not made clear the relevance of its questions in a
legitimate investigation, or had not properly informed a witness of his consti-
tutional rights.7 2 A federal appellate court has rendered decisions denying the
right of the Secretary of State to withhold or withdraw passports on the basis
of loyalty or security charges, without according the persons involved- a proper
hearing. 3 The same court has denied to the government, acting as landlord,
the right to evict a tenant on the ground of his alleged membership in a sub-
versive organization without clear proof of his membership in an organization
clearly shown to be subversive.74 A federal grand jury has indicted a private
rooming house owner for falsely accusing a White House clerk of being sub-
versive. Some department heads have cancelled guilt-by-association or guilt-
by-kinship charges. The Secretary of the Army has taken steps towards ending
"defects and abuses" in his department's personnel-security system; and the
Attorney General has initiated an inquiry into charges, based on responsible
reports, of party officials' interferences with voting by Negroes in a recent
primary election in a Southern state.
Obviously, the rightness of any of these actions does not cancel out or miti-
gate the wrongness of remaining abuses. But the corrections may be significant
enough to justify the hopeful final words of Rodell's informative, caustic his-
tory of the Supreme Court. He says that "under the inspiration of . . . two
great Justices [Douglas and Black] and the aegis of a potentially great Chief
Justice [Warren], the American dream of freedom may be reborn."7 5
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